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Abstract: 
 
In global capitalism, a driving force of urban development is “accumulation by dispossession” 
which occurs through expropriation, privatization and commodification of land. While the macro 
theory has been well constructed, there is still a lot we do not know about how these underlying 
processes occur and shape economic development and urbanization. This study looks at land 
expropriation in China and works to fill some of these gaps in our understanding of the 
underlying processes and impacts on economic development and urbanization. We analyze 2009 
survey data of land expropriation cases across 12 Chinese cities and finds that expropriation 
takes different forms which leads to specific outcomes. In half of the cases, the local government 
followed central government policies requiring them to pay standard rates of compensation, but 
in the other half, the local government negotiated with farmers over the terms of expropriation 
rather than using set formulas. In the latter scenario, farmers were 37.2% more likely to receive 
compensation higher than the standard rate. However, these negotiations and higher rates of 
compensation disproportionately favor farmers who are embedded in local power structures, 
which we argue could be counteracted if all households in a rural collective negotiate one 
agreement rather than individual agreements. These findings move us closer to understanding 
why these processes associated with accumulation through dispossession sometimes contribute 
to economic growth and social development, and at other times undermine urban development 
and lead to social instability. 
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Introduction: urban development and land issues 
 
Scholars have argued that accumulation through dispossession plays an important role in the 
growth of global capitalism (Arrighi, 2006; Harvey, 2003; Glassman, 2006). The term 
“accumulation by dispossession” coined by Harvey (2003) extends Marx’s concept of primitive 
accumulation.  For Marx, primitive accumulation includes forcefully taking land, enclosing it, 
privatizing it and expelling the population to create proletariat, those dependent on waged labor. 
The process of primitive accumulation is central to Marx’s theory of capitalism as it explains the 
origins of surplus which makes capital accumulation possible. Harvey’s (2003) slight alteration 
of Marx’s theory suggested that accumulation is not only important in explaining the origins of 
capitalism, but it is also an important mechanism through which global capitalism spreads. This 
accumulation, known as accumulation through dispossession, and the underlying processes of 
expropriation, privatization and commodification of land have become highly contested elements 
of global capitalism, both in practice and in scholarship.  Some scholars argue that accumulation 
by dispossession is a necessary step in capitalist development which allows for more productive 
use of land and labor (Deininger, 2003), while others argue that it can undermine economic 
growth and social development (Arrighi, Aschoff, & Scully, 2010).  In this paper, we do not 
enter the political debate over whether it is necessary that farmers should be protected from 
expropriation and dispossession. Instead, we answer calls for more nuanced analysis and careful 
empirical inquiry to inform our understanding of these processes (Borras & Franco, 2010). We 
use China as a case study and document the way that land expropriation occurs during 
urbanization, the form that it takes, and the outcomes. This moves us closer to understanding 
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why these processes sometimes contribute to economic growth and social development, and at 
other times, undermine urban development and lead to social instability.  
 
In China, it is estimated that there are no less than 50 million farmers who have lost their 
land through expropriation and the number continues to rise by the millions every year (Li, 2011).  
Furthermore, land issues have become one of the most contentious aspects of China’s urban 
development, evidenced by the fact that by 2010 over 65% of all “mass incidents” and 75% of all 
petitions filed by rural residents were protests over loss of land (Cui, Tao, Warner, & Yang, 
2013). There are three important factors that help explain this growing demand on land and the 
rising number of land expropriations occurring in China: urbanization, industrialization, and 
changes in the financing of local governments.  
 
In 1979, less than 20 percent of China’s population lived in urban areas but this had 
grown to over 50 percent by 2010 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011). This acute rise 
in new urban residents forced cities to physically expand by subsuming and converting 
agricultural land on the outskirts to be used for factories, urban housing, and infrastructure (G. C. 
S. Lin, 2007).  As a result, the constructed area of China’s cities grew by 50 percent from 1998 
to 2005, turning existing cities into megacities and producing new cities almost overnight (Cao, 
Feng, & Tao, 2008).  Another important factor behind increasing land expropriations is 
industrialization, especially in the form of large industrial parks and special economic zones 
(SEZs), both of which require large tracts of land. Industrial parks and SEZs are important tools 
used by local governments to attract precious sought after foreign investment. As a result, from 
2003 to 2006 the number of industrial parks had nearly double from 3837 to 6015 (Cao et al., 
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2008).  Along similar lines, in 1988, the central government established the country’s first five 
special economic zones (SEZs), four in Guangdong and Fujian provinces and one encompassing 
Hainan Island.  By 1994, there were 422 zones with official approval and many others that had 
been established outside of official channels (Cartier, 2001). SEZs have a significant influence 
on local land markets because they encompass large geographical areas, usually a city or region, 
and result in speculative real estate practices which add to the demand for land acquisition, 
conversion and commodification.  
 
A third important factor behind increasing land expropriation in China is municipal 
governments’ reliance on revenues generated from leasing land use rights.  Reforms to the 
central-local government fiscal relationship have resulted in fiscal decentralization which has 
shifted more financial burdens onto local governments. However, municipalities have few 
devices that they can use to generate income, especially since the abolishment of the agricultural 
tax in 2004. As a result, localities expropriate collective land so that they can use it for collateral 
in development projects or convey the land use rights to commercial users allowing them to earn 
much needed income. This has become a crucial source of funding used to cover local 
government expenses associated with economic development projects, infrastructure needs, and 
social welfare for citizens. Between 1993 and1998, the number of times local governments used 
land use rights for collateral skyrocketed from 1, 592 to 104,476 (Ho & Lin, 2003). These trends 
have been exacerbated by the 2008 financial crisis when the Chinese central government 
introduced a 4 trillion yuan (USD586 billion) bailout, one-third of which was earmarked for 
infrastructure projects that required local governments to produce matching funds. This 
intensified efforts to raise revenue through land expropriation and resulted in a process of “land-
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induced financialization” (Sum, 2011).  Taken together, the dire land needs of expanding cities, 
increasing industrialization, and the increasing gap in funding for local municipalities and their 
ever-expanding set of fiscal responsibilities have all fed the frenzy of land expropriation.   
 
Scholars have documented the development and changes in China’s land tenure system 
(Zhao & Webster, 2011; Lin and Ho, 2005), its relationship to urbanization (Lichtenberg & Ding, 
2009; Yuting Liu, He, Wu, & Webster, 2010), and the struggles of dispossessed farmers, 
migrants and urban poor (Guo, 2001; Tao & Xu, 2007; Zhang, 2001). However, much less is 
known about the actual process of land expropriation; that is the process of land expropriation in 
which agricultural land is taken from farmers so that it can be commodified (converted for non-
agricultural uses). We do not know how land is expropriated, when it is negotiated, when it is 
simply implemented according to regulations and when it is just taken illegally. We do not know 
much about negotiations for expropriation or the outcomes and resulting compensation (Zhao & 
Webster, 2011). In an effort to fill some of these gaps, this article analyzes 2009 survey data 
drawn from a large sample of land expropriation cases across 12 cities in China. We find that in 
China, how land is expropriated matters. Our data reveals that, despite the fact that set formulas 
should be used to calculate compensation, almost half of the cases of land expropriation included 
negotiations. Furthermore, when negotiations were used in the process, farmers were more likely 
to gain compensation that is higher than what is mandated by the central government.   
 
In the next section, we provide an overview of China’s changing land policies and the 
emerging dual track system used to make land transfers. It also looks closely at land 
requisitioning and expropriation which are the main mechanisms through which lands are 
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transferred from farmers to the state and converted from agricultural to commercial, urban or 
industrial use. The second section introduces our survey data and provides some basic 
descriptive statistics on our land expropriation cases collected in 12 cities across four economic 
regions of China. The third section, presents the data analysis in which we focus on 
understanding the role of negotiations in shaping compensation outcomes. Finally, the last 
section draws some conclusions from our findings.  
 
Understanding China’s changing land policy: from allocation to commodification 
A central feature and key principle underlying the Communist revolution in China was land 
reform. This reform included a drastic policy shift as private property was replaced by the 
socialist principle of public ownership of land. The resulting system was a state monopoly on 
land through resource control and administrative allocation. Urban land was in the hands of the 
state, mainly through enterprises, and most rural land was in the hands of rural collectives. This 
system of state allocation has been reformed over the past thirty years with the contradictory 
goals of transferring urban land for commercial use while protecting the principle of public 
ownership and food security associated with rural lands, leading to what is often characterized as 
a dual land market or a dualist system of distribution.i  In this system, the rules that govern urban 
land transfers are very different than those governing rural land transfers. 
 
In the 1980s early land reform separated land use rights from land ownership creating a 
pathway for conveyance of the land use rights to commercial users. The first major step in this 
direction was the 1986 implementation of the Household Responsibility System (HRS) which 
changed the relationship between farmers and land by shifting agricultural land, and the 
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decision-making power in terms of land use, from the collective to individual households. In the 
same year, the state adopted the Land Management Law and established the Land Bureau, both 
of which focused on developing land markets by separating land use rights from ownership and 
regulating the conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural use (Ho and Lin, 2003).   
 
Land commodification continued with a constitutional amendment in 1988 which 
allowed for paid transfers of land use rights. However, in an effort to protect agricultural lands, 
the selling of land use rights was limited to state-owned property (usually urban), explicitly 
excluding transfers of land use rights associated with collectively-owned rural lands  (Wang, 
Zhao, Xiaokaiti, Zhou, & Zhao, 2012). This constitutional amendment was accompanied by a 
number of other provisions and regulations that worked to establish a quasi-market for land use 
rights (Xu, Yeh, & Wu, 2009).  Over time, the dualistic nature of China’s land distribution 
system has become solidified; one segment consists of a quasi-market with paid transfers of land 
use rights (urban), and a second segment, primarily rural and agricultural, continues to operate 
using the pre-existing system of state allocation. Farmers cannot directly sell or lease rural land 
use rights but the state can expropriate or take the land in the “interest of the state,ii” convert it to 
non-agricultural uses, and then separate the land ownership from land use rights, leasing the 
latter. This system in which farmers and collectives cannot directly sell their land or lease land 
use rights for non-agricultural purposes was created to protect rural lands, public ownership, and 
food security in the face of development pressures. However, instead of preserving agricultural 
lands it has created opportunities for profitable arbitrage which is feeding the fire of uncontrolled 
development (Ho and Lin, 2005). It is not only straining China’s land distribution system but 
also intensifying inherent contradictions, and resulting in increased social unrest.  
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The dualistic nature of the system underlies and reinforces urban-rural tensions in China. 
Rapid development and urbanization requires cities to expropriate rural lands, convert the land 
use from agricultural to non-agricultural and then lease land use rights. This places the process of 
land expropriation and land dispossession at the heart of China’s urbanization and development 
process. As Lin and Yi (2011) state,  
 
In the existing literature, urban and rural land has often been treated separately. But given 
the fact that these sectors are interconnected and that much of the land used for urban 
development has been directly expropriated from the rural sector, it would not be possible 
to understand the complex processes of land development without closely examining how 
land is taken away from the rural collective at low cost for high-value urban development 
(Lin & Yi, 2011 p.53). 
 
Our study looks closely at this process of expropriation and tries to understand how the 
land is taken away from rural collectives. We compare cases in which the process follows the 
dictates of the law and those which move beyond the law to include negotiations, and we look at 
how those negotiations impact compensation outcomes. 
 
The legal framework which allows for land requisition and expropriation is created by the 
Land Administration Law (LAL) which was amended in 1998 to allow for state requisitioning of 
rural lands in the public’s interest. The concept of public interest was not clearly defined by the 
LAL, allowing for a broad scope of land requisitioning which, in practice, expanded well beyond 
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land for infrastructural development to include any land to be used for urban purposes. The 
process of land requisitioning under the LAL included taking both land ownership and land use 
rights from rural collectives and placing them in the hands of local government.   However, by 
2004, the national government amended laws to differentiate between these two types of 
acquisitions; land expropriation (tudi zhengshou) refers to changes in both the use rights and the 
land ownership, and land requisition (tudi zhengyong) refers to a change in who owns the land 
use rights but no change in actual land ownership (Lin & Ho, 2005). The former, land 
expropriation, is required to convert rural collective-owned land into state-owned land, which 
then allows for the sale/leasing of the land use rights for commercial, infrastructure and 
industrial purposes. 
  
The process the state uses to acquire lands from rural collectives is strictly regulated by 
the central government.  The LAL and policy documents issued by the Ministry of Land 
Resources specify formulas that should be used to calculate the amount of compensation that 
should be given to farmers for loss of collectively-owned land. Calculations based on those 
formulas and the fact that the average farmer in China has .07 ha of collectively-owned land 
suggest that dispossessed farmers receive between RMB¥5,000-¥9,000 (USD$821-$1,477) for 
land that the state plans to use for transportation, and between RMB¥20,000-¥30,000 
(USD$3,282-$4,924) for land that will be used for commercial and/or industrial development, 
but the state then leases the land use rights to developers for seven to ten times more (Cao et al., 
2008).  Furthermore, farmers are becoming more aware of this price arbitrage because the 
leasing of land use rights for commercial and residential purposes has shifted from being 
negotiated in private to being tendered or auctioned, creating more transparency. 
10 
 
 
The central government has tried different strategies to minimize the exploitation of 
farmers occurring through expropriation of lands. They have issued several directives since 2004 
requiring local governments to 1) raise compensation to farmers and 2) to constrain local 
government’s unfair and often illegal methods of land acquisition. This directed attention to an 
important problem uncovered by a 2005 survey conducted by the Ministry of Land and 
Resources which found that 50 percent of new land under development was acquired illegally, 
and in some places, it was over 90 percent of land that was acquired illegally (Xinhua News, 
2006 in Cao, 2008). Again, in an effort to minimize exploitation through dispossession, the 
Central government also took the drastic measure of suspending land sales in 2004 for six 
months. Later, in 2005 they started disqualifying industrial development zones that were 
developed through such methods and set up without prior authorization (Cao, 208, 26). In spite 
of these efforts, land development has continued, and sometimes in even more sophisticated 
ways as to circumvent new state rules (Lin & Ho, 2005). There has also been a growing informal 
market in which farmers, local government agencies, and collectives are leasing their land use 
rights directly to interested parties (Wang & Scott, 2008; Xu et al., 2009).  However, perhaps one 
of the most effective strategies for minimizing the exploitation of farmers is the evolving market-
based effort of negotiation. Our data reveals that, despite the fact that set formulas should be 
used to calculate compensation, almost half of the cases of land expropriation include 
negotiations. In the next section, we introduce our data and present descriptive statistics which is 
followed by an analysis of how these negotiations impact the compensation that farmers receive 
when land is expropriated. 
 
11 
 
Methodology and descriptive statistics: survey of land expropriation in China 
 
This study analyzes the survey data from a sample of land requisition cases in 12 cities in 2009. 
The survey covered four major economic regions in China: Yangtze River Delta region, Pearl 
River Delta region, Circum-Bohai-Sea region, Cheng-Yu region. We randomly selected three 
cities from each region to minimize regional bias. In each city, we randomly selected 100 land 
expropriation cases from a database provided by the local government agencies (e.g. Land and 
Resources Bureau). The research team then conducted in person interviews with the famers who 
were involved with these cases to complete the surveys.  
 
Our final sample consists of 773 land expropriation cases after eliminating incomplete 
cases. There were three different types of cases based on the kind of land/structures that were 
taken. One group included 296 cases which had their farmland, gardens, and fishponds 
expropriated. The second group included 191 cases in which their houses and other nonfarm land 
was expropriated. Finally, the last group had 286 cases which had both farmland and nonfarm 
land taken. Of these 773 cases, almost half, 364 (or 47.09%) said that they had negotiations with 
the local government in the land requisition process and 17 said they were not sure. The 
distribution is provided in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
As mentioned above, the Central government strictly regulates land expropriation and 
dictates that farmers are compensated using a set formula. However, there is a lot of variance in 
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actual practices.  As Table 1 indicates, among all 12 cities surveyed, city of Chengdu has the 
highest percentage of land expropriation cases that included negotiations (79.63%). This is much 
higher than the average (47.09%). Also, there is variation across regions (see Fig. 1). The Cheng-
Yu region has the highest percentage of expropriation cases with negotiations (58.40%), 
followed by Circum-Bohai-Sea region (55.92%), Pearl River Delta region (39.47%), and 
Yangtze River Delta region (28.13%). As these statistics suggest, while negotiations are a fairly 
common practice in land expropriation cases, they are clearly a more established practice in 
some cities and regions. Although we did not directly investigate why negotiations are used more 
frequently in some areas, we hypothesize that it is related to local government practices. We 
think that in some places, like the Cheng-Yu region which includes the city of Chengdu, local 
governments tend to offer the lowest compensation possible under the central government’s set 
formulas and as a result, it increases the number of farmers who demand negotiations. However, 
this question deserves further investigation and research. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
In our interviews we asked farmers which actors participated in negotiations over the 
land expropriation? The answers are presented in Table 2. Village cadres and representatives of 
farmers (whose land would be expropriated) are the major participants in most negotiations. 
Somewhat surprisingly we found that they are not the only participants. Social organizations 
have also actively participated in some regions (e.g. Circum Bohai Sea Region and Cheng Yu 
Region). In some cases, this included non-governmental organizations (NGO). The most 
13 
 
common example is the Rural Elders Association, a grassroots NGO that consists of elder 
farmers which has the capability to rally farmers, thus potentially playing a crucial role in the 
negotiations. In recent years, formal and informal social organizations are becoming more 
important in these negotiations suggesting that farmers rely on outside sources of pressure to 
influence negotiations (Liu, 2009).  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
In our interviews with farmers we also asked, "In these negotiations, who were the 
representatives for the other side’s negotiation team?" Table 3 presents a distribution of the 
answers. Representatives include cadres from municipal (county, district) government offices, 
cadres in townships or sub-district offices, representatives from land-using parties (such as 
developers), police or public security officers, and others. In most cases, the counterpart in 
negotiations consists of government cadres (362 cases in our sample had government cadres 
participating in the negotiations).  In more than half of the cases with negotiations, only the state 
and the farmers were involved, while in less than half of the cases (137 cases), negotiations also 
included a representative from the land-using party. Also, although it happens (in 15 of our 
cases), it was rare to have policemen participate in the negotiations.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Most negotiations took the form of meetings; for example, meetings between the village 
representatives and the local government officials or land-using party (see Table 4). While 59.62% 
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said that the negotiations were conducted in the form of meetings, another 19.23% said that 
negotiations occurred in the form of household visits by local officials, and another 12.36% said 
that the negotiations included both meetings and household visits. We also find that household 
visits happened more often when expropriation included taking and demolishing a farmer’s 
house or when it included taking productive farmland.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Our interviews also ask about the content of the negotiations. Table 5 shows the range of 
topics that are discussed in negotiations.  As expected, the most common topic is compensation 
rates (273 cases). Relocation issues related to the demolition of houses is also discussed in 148 
cases, and in 117 cases they discussed relocation assistance and pension insurance that would be 
provided in lieu of expropriated farmland. The compensation rate, relocation assistance, and 
pension insurance are three main topics covered in negotiations. It is noteworthy that the issue of 
employment is negotiated more often in the Cheng Yu region as compared to other areas. In part, 
this may be because the Cheng Yu region is located inland whereas the other three regions are in 
the East and have been undergoing industrialization and urbanization for a longer period of time. 
Therefore, in the three regions in the East, more of the farmers have already made the transition 
into waged labor and are more likely to be employed in non-agricultural sectors. This means that 
despite their “farmer” classification under the hukou system they are no longer farmers per 
se.iiiWe hypothesize that this is why the negotiations in these three regions are less likely to 
include discussions about employment.  
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[Table 5 about here] 
 
The farmers were also asked about the timing of the negotiations with the local 
government or the land-using party. In Table 6, it can be seen that 276 interviewees said that 
they had negotiations with the local governments only after the government released a notice of 
their intention to expropriate the property. Interestingly, 50 interviewees said they had 
negotiations with the local governments after the land requisition agreement had been signed and 
another 9 interviewees said they had negotiations with the local governments when the land-
using party entered the site to start the construction. Theoretically, the best timing of negotiation 
is the period after the government notice is released and before the land requisition agreement is 
signed, as the notices, hearings, and agreement signing all takes place in this stage. However, we 
find a significant amount of cases started their negotiations after the land requisition agreement 
had been signed. We hypothesize that the negotiation power of the farmers may actually increase 
during this period since there is more at stake for the other parties. Specifically, at this point the 
state as the new owner of the land and the land-using party began to lose potential revenues. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
In terms of negotiation outcomes, we asked the following question to each interviewee 
who had participated in negotiations: "Did you finally reach agreement through negotiations?" 
The results in Table 7 show that 15.66% of the farmers said they reached complete agreements 
with local governments or land-using party while 71.70% said they reached a partial agreement. 
The households who answered "partial disagreement" or "complete disagreement" were only 
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6.59% and 4.67% of all interviewees. Even though only 364 households among the 773 in our 
sample said they were engaged in negotiations, around 90% of those who participated in 
negotiations actually reached some level of agreement. This also suggests that further research is 
needed to understand these partial agreements, especially what is agreed upon and where are the 
agreements breaking down.  
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
In the next section we present our analysis which looks at how these negotiations impact 
the level of compensation that farmers receive and how this informs our broader understanding 
of land expropriation and dispossession.  
 
Empirical analysis: the impact of negotiations on the compensation in the process of land 
expropriation 
 
Model specification 
 
Our empirical analysis focuses on whether the negotiations will increase the actual compensation 
to be above the standard rate set by the government. Therefore, the dependent variable is defined 
as whether the actual compensation for land expropriation (including demolition) is higher than 
the standard rate established by the government. The survey results show that the compensation 
amount agreed after negotiations is somewhere between the standard rates established according 
to the government’s land expropriation policy and the market value of the land.iv   
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For the 12 cities in our sample, the actual compensation for each case is compared to the 
standard compensation rate set by the central government and the results are presented in Table 
8.v  Overall, there is variation among these 12 cities in terms of the percentage of cases receiving 
higher-than-standard compensations. In some cities like Weifang, 78% of the cases received 
compensation that is higher than standard rates, while other cities like Ningbo are almost the 
reverse, with 77% of the cases receiving standard rates or less.  On average, the cases that the 
actual compensation exceeds the standard compensation rates account for 44.24%. Four cities 
have over half of the land expropriation cases receiving higher-than-standard compensations.  
 
[Table 8 about here] 
     
Our empirical model takes a Logit model specification: 
 
β0+β1Negotiationsi+β2Homesteadi+β3Land+β4ApliLandtakei+β5Agriincsharei+β6Agei+β7Gende
ri+β8Expedui+β9Fampopi+β10Famworkouti+β11Incpci+β12Famccpi+β13Famcadrei+β14Famsurna
mei+β15RelaCadrei+β15Cj+ ei 
 
 is the probability that the actual compensation rate for household i is higher than the 
standard rate of compensation for land and demolished houses. The dependent variable, which 
measures the odds ratio, refers to whether the actual compensation is higher than the standard 
rate set by the government. If the actual compensation is higher, the response variable is coded as 
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1. Otherwise, the response variable is coded as 0. ei is the error term that follows the standard 
normal distribution.  
 
Our variable of interest—Negotiationsi—refers to whether there is a negotiation between 
the ith farmer and the local government (which often involves the land-using party as well) 
regarding the land expropriation. Other explanatory variables include personal demographics and 
socioeconomic conditions of the households. We include personal demographics such as age, 
gender, education background of the interviewee, and whether she/he is a party member, village 
cadre or served in the army. Household socioeconomic characteristics include land size, purpose 
of the expropriated land, percentage of agricultural income in the family, number of family 
members, per capita income, number of party members in the family, number of village cadre in 
the family, whether there is a migrant worker in the family, number of relatives and friends who 
are village cadres, and whether the household belongs to a big clan in the village. Ci is a dummy 
variable that represents the specific city each household lives in. The definition of each variable 
and its measure is presented in Table 9. The statistical descriptions of the variables are provided 
in Table 10. It is shown that 47.09% of the households had negotiations in the land requisition 
process. 
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
Model results 
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The Logit model results and estimates of marginal effects are presented in Table 11. 
 
[Table 11 about here] 
 
One of our central hypotheses is that if there are any negotiations, the amount of 
compensation will increase from the standard rate to benefit the farmers. Based on the Logit 
model, we find that the variable of interest—negotiation—is statistically significant (at a 
confidence level of 99%) and it increases the likelihood of having a higher-than-standard 
compensation. As far as the marginal effect is concerned, we find that the presence of 
negotiations increases the probability of actual compensation being higher than the standard rate 
by 37.2%. 
 
The model results also show that it is 20.7% more likely for the actual compensation to 
be higher than the standard rate if there is house demolition associated with land requisition. 
Note that the marginal effect of house demolition is estimated after controlling for whether there 
has been a negotiation or not. This result suggests that local government tends to offer higher 
compensation for land expropriations involving house demolitions, regardless of whether or not 
negotiations are used. This is expected because farmers would need some sort of incentive (e.g. a 
higher-than-standard compensation) to compensate for their emotional stress. In fact, in cases 
involving house demolition, it is required that each homeowner signs an agreement with the local 
government before the compensation and relocation plan can take effect. This has greatly 
increased the need for local governments to face the homeowners individually in negotiations. In 
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general, the staff from the local government will visit the households one by one to negotiate the 
compensation rate, relocation plans, and other details of the expropriation. The final 
compensation plans are generally more favorable to the farmers than the original ones. 
Furthermore, beyond the regular compensation, there are often monetary incentives for early 
consent, especially in cases that include house demolitions. For example, there are prizes for 
early signing of the agreement, moving out on time, and assisting with getting others to sign 
agreements. In the survey, we find that nearly all demolition cases included some monetary 
incentive, ranging from several thousand to one hundred thousand yuan (up to USD$16,413), 
which was paid in addition to the agreed upon compensation.  
 
Our analysis shows that personal demographics such as age, gender, education 
background are not significant in shaping compensation rates. However, factors including 
household per capita income, households with a village cadre, households belonging to the 
dominant village clan, and households with a migrant worker outside of the village all have a 
significant and positive impact. For every ¥1000 increase in per capita household income, the 
household is 0.204% more likely to receive a higher-than-standard compensation. If the number 
of village cadres in the household increases by one, it is 30.2% more likely to get a higher-than-
standard compensation. If the household's surname belongs to one of the dominant clans in the 
village, the household is 14.2% more likely to get a higher-than-standard compensation. If the 
household has a member working in another city as a migrant worker, the family is 8.26% more 
likely to get a higher compensation. There could be several reasons for these findings.  
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First, even if the land expropriation process is not accompanied by negotiations, the local 
government will rely on village cadres and the dominant village clans to ensure the success of 
land expropriation, thus the privileged position of these households allow them to benefit more 
than ordinary households when it comes to getting compensated for expropriated land. Second, 
after the standard compensation money is distributed by the local government, the cadres and 
dominant clan members can influence how any leftover money should be distributed. The village 
cadres are the ones in charge of implementing money distribution plans, so it is not surprising 
that having a village cadre in the family ranks second among all factors in terms of marginal 
effect.  Also, often there is overlap in members of the dominant clans and those who serve as 
village cadres, explaining why clans may also have an impact on the distribution of this money. 
Finally, it is generally true that households that are wealthier, those with a village cadre, 
members from the dominant clan, or those who have a migrant worker all probably have better 
social and political resources. They also have better knowledge of the compensation rate in other 
cities or provinces, which, to some extent, is used as a benchmark for their own compensation.  
 
Somewhat more surprising is the variance across cities. We used the city of Yueqing as 
the reference for creating and adding dummy variables for cities in the model.vi It shows that, 
compared with Yueqing, nine cities (Ningbo, Jiangyin, Sanhe, Weifang, Jinan, Guangzhou, 
Dongguan, Chongqing, and Chengdu) are more likely to have actual compensation rates higher 
than the standard rates. The estimates of the marginal effects suggest a substantial level of 
differences among these cities in terms of the tendency to offer higher-than-standard 
compensation. More research is needed to understand the reasons that cause the variance across 
these cities. 
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Conclusion 
The analyses of 2009 survey data of land expropriation cases across 12 Chinese cities find that 
despite the fact that compensation rates for land expropriation are set by the central government, 
negotiations are not only widespread in the expropriation process, but they also yield better 
compensation for farmers who are losing their land. This suggests that while the land 
expropriation policy has not been fundamentally reformed in China, it is possible to use 
negotiations to reduce the extent to which farmers' rights are being infringed.  
 
Our study shows that almost half of land expropriation cases include some form of 
negotiations. We explore what cases include negotiations, at what point in the process of 
expropriation do these negotiations occur, and what are the outcomes.  Our findings show that 
the current system that requires the state to pay set compensation rates to farmers when 
expropriating their land actually disadvantages farmers. This leads us to conclude that 
negotiations in expropriation cases can help to increase compensation to farmers and increase 
legitimacy of the process. However, this requires that negotiations and consultation become a 
standard part of the expropriation process. 
 
In examining the cases of land expropriation that include negotiations we have two 
important central findings. There is a higher level of compensation given to farmers, but it is not 
evenly distributed as power relations within the village seem to significantly impact 
compensation outcomes. Farmers who have village cadres in the family, who belong to the 
dominant clan in the village, who have household members working in other cities  or those with 
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higher family income are more likely to yield higher compensation. Therefore, we recommend 
that all households in a collective should negotiate under one agreement (rather than individual 
agreements) and the final agreement should require all household signatures before the land 
requisition and relocation can take place. We make these recommendations to counteract a 
disproportionate percentage of the benefits going to privileged families in the village. This kind 
of group negotiation could help assure that all farmers, rather than just those embedded in local 
power structures, benefit and receive fair compensation. These measures could increase 
legitimacy of the process, which could increase social stability by helping to decrease the 
number of protests related to land issues. 
 
In sum, “accumulation by dispossession” is a driving force of urbanization under global 
capitalism, and as such, it has become highly contested and political. It is important to 
understand how the underlying processes of expropriation, privatization and commodification of 
land are occurring. In looking at how land expropriation occurs in China, and how negotiation 
shapes the outcomes, we move closer to understanding why these processes associated with 
accumulation through dispossession sometimes contribute to economic growth and social 
development, and at other times undermine urban development and lead to social instability. Our 
findings suggest that we must understand the form of land expropriation because it really matters. 
It is important to balance the power behind different interests involved in restructuring land 
ownership and land rights. Farmers need a voice and space in which they can struggle for their 
own interests. At the minimum, this requires that negotiations be part of the process, occurring 
early in the process, that they are collective rather than one-on-one, and that land expropriation 
processes do not go forward without full agreement.  
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i There are important debates over whether this system constitutes a market, but this debate is not central to the 
points made in this article. See (Haila, 2007) 
ii This clause is similar to the idea of public use in eminent domain laws in  some Western countries. 
iii The hukou system (household registration system) is a registration system in which all individuals are registered 
with the local government where their parent’s hukou is held. Their access to social welfare and public goods are 
tied to their place of registration.  Those who hold a rural/agricultural hukou tend to have less access to quality 
goods and welfare as compared to those who hold an urban/non-agricultural hukou.  It is very difficult to change 
one’s hukou status and place of registration, especially if one wants to traverse the rural-urban designation.  
iv Here we are equating the market rate with the rate that the government turns around and negotiations with the 
land-using party.   
v By examining the land expropriation compensation policies implemented by the local governments (which usually 
comply to the formula established by the central government), we can determine whether the actual compensation 
farmers received is higher than the standard compensation rate set by such policies 
vi The selection of Yueqing as the reference city was an arbitrary choice, but it would not impact the model results 
had we used a different reference. 
